The US’s many and various spy agencies appear to be in a bit of a mess. Over relying on technological innovation, signals eavesdropping and drone strikes they’ver rather lost their way. They’ve certainly downplayed or completely ignored the age old basics of spying: going out and finding well placed human sources and recruiting them.
I certainly learned a lot from reading Michael Ross’s book, The Volunteer, about how the Mossad does this. Now Michael has posted the following advice to the US’s spy masters on the blog of Robert Caruso, a Navy veteran and former US security service officer. One hopes they take some of it on board. Here is an extract of his suggestions [Read the full thing].
Guest post: Michael Ross: as the Defense Clandestine Service takes shape, look to the Mossad for a proven model
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1. Reject the temptation to operate on a geographical station model. Terrorist networks and non-conventional weapons proliferators do not operate geographically. The station system is analogous to fiefdoms in a feudal system and only encourages turf wars and a culture of conflict between command and the field. Hierarchical constructs and regionalism cannot effectively combat networks.
2. Abandon the State Department cover system. Embassy-based intelligence collecting entities are counter-productive. Operations should be conducted overseas through deep cover operational platforms that are in no way connected to any diplomatic or official USG entity.
3. Focus case officers exclusively on gathering human intelligence overseas. The U.S. military has a large number of officers trained by the CIA that can be deployed globally in operational platforms. These platforms can operate autonomously with tasking, intelligence, and logistical support from HQs representatives.
4. Devote resources to status and operational cover possibilities and promote a culture of innovation, conception, flexibility and imaginativeness in this regard.
5. Tasking functions should focus on high quality targets for human source intelligence that can provide information on strategic intent and not exclusively on trivial sources that only provide tactical and capability-based intelligence.
6. Defense Clandestine Service personnel should reside in a culture of the highest levels of compartmentation and operational security. Officers should have rare interaction with other operatives and not have connection with HQs where possible.
7. Training should be conducted at a separate facility to which no other agency has access.
8. A proactive and autonomous CI component with clear mandates should be integrated into the service.
9. Career advancement and promotion should be tied directly to operational success in the field. Lengthy service at HQs should not be regarded as a means to advance in the organization. All senior management up to and including the heads of operational divisions in the Mossad, are veterans of lengthy service in operational assignments overseas.
10. Co-ordinate national-level HUMINT efforts. Inter-agency cooperation and deconfliction protocols should be established early on to avoid a redundant collection effort. Working relationships and understanding mutual objectives and mission mandates is critical for success.
11. The requirements and tasking process for the Defense Clandestine Service should shift from war zones and areas of conflict to epicenter target countries such as Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and China.
Human source intelligence collection is as much a psychological and emotional construct as it is a political, military, or national security one. When broken down to its lowest common denominator, HUMINT is not an academic exercise that can be understood by rote formula or analyzed by a linear thinking process. This new defense intelligence enterprise should readily adopt an organizational culture that rejects parochial perspectives while fostering continual adaptation and innovation.
Typical defense intelligence priorities must undergo a conceptual shift. The tradition of providing tactical intelligence to support military commanders is extremely important; but only understanding our adversaries’ capabilities without knowing their intentions means we’re only winning half the battle.
Michael Ross is the author of The Volunteer and an expert on intelligence and terrorism and a former Mossad officer who served in the Near East, Africa and Asia for eleven years, and was the Mossad’s counterterrorism liaison officer to the CIA and FBI for two-and-a-half years.
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